One tap into
Seus usuários entram como eles mesmos — sem parear, sem tokens copiados.
One tap for them,
Uma entrada à prova de sequestro para parceiros com base própria de usuários — uma ação de admin, zero tokens trocados.
Um toque para eles
Seu usuário clica num botão do seu produto e chega ao painel já autenticado. Sem onboarding, sem credenciais para gerenciar, nada para explicar na sua documentação de suporte.
Uma ação de admin para você
Registrar um único cliente de federação é a integração inteira. Não há código por parceiro para escrever, hospedar ou manter — o seu lado fica exatamente como está.
Seu backend, do seu jeito
Funciona com sessões do Directus, backends personalizados assinados com HMAC ou apps que já rodam seu próprio projeto Supabase. O broker se adapta à sua autenticação — e não o contrário.
À prova de sequestro por design
Identidades são chaveadas por provedor mais sujeito — nunca por um simples e-mail. Fundir com uma conta existente exige passar por quatro guardas rigorosas, e fundir com um admin é simplesmente impossível.
Contido por padrão
Cada usuário provisionado cai em um papel limitado, cada cliente carrega seus próprios limites de taxa e há um botão de desligamento instantâneo se algo parecer errado. Generoso com usuários, avarento com privilégios.
How one tap
A short-lived, single-use code with proof-of-possession — the same shape as OAuth PKCE, minus any token in your hands.
Register one client
01An admin registers your federation client: the verify mode, a redirect allowlist, per-client rate limits, and the capped role every signed-in user receives.
Your backend vouches
02Your button calls the broker with a PKCE challenge. The broker verifies against YOUR auth — a live Directus session check, an HMAC-signed assertion, or your own Supabase JWT.
A 60-second code
03The user gets a link carrying a single-use code that expires in 60 seconds. Only its hash is stored, and the redirect target is decided server-side, at start time.
We mint the session
04The Busymate app or dashboard redeems the code with the PKCE proof and receives a real session for a real account. Your app never sees or stores a Busymate token.
Who can see
Defaults enforced by row-level security in the database — and the one explicit action that changes each of them.
| Question | The default | What changes it |
|---|---|---|
| Who sees a device? | Its owner, plus roles holding the devices-view capability — checked by the database on every read. | An admin-created access grant scoped to one device, service group, or user — with an optional expiry. |
| Who sees captured traffic? | The account that captured it. Traffic follows its captor, not the device it came from. | Nothing implicit — a device grant does not quietly widen traffic reads. |
| What role does a federated user get? | The client's capped role — a configurable least-privilege role. The database refuses an admin role at write time. | You edit the client's capped role. Role hints inside partner assertions are ignored by design. |
| Can an assertion take over an account? | No. Identity keys on client plus subject; a colliding email gets a private no-merge address instead of the existing account. | Email linking is a per-client opt-in — and even then it refuses admin and protected accounts. |
| Where can the flow redirect? | Busymate hosts plus the client's registered allowlist — exact host match; anything else collapses to the dashboard root. | The client's redirect allowlist, editable only by an admin with a confirmed write. |
| What if a client misbehaves? | Per-client rate limits that fail closed, and denial events written to the audit trail before the response is sent. | Flip the client's kill switch — it is re-checked on every sign-in start, so it takes effect immediately. |
Three real
Delegation and handover are explicit, scoped rows — not tribal shared passwords.
“Give our contractor the three staging phones”
One access grant: a non-admin role scoped to that service group, with an expiry date. Revoking deletes the row — the contractor's reach evaluates to nothing on the very next database check.
“Hand this device to a teammate”
An admin-confirmed transfer moves ownership in one transaction. Captured history stays with whoever captured it and device-local settings are wiped — a clean handover, not a data migration.
“Let our platform's users debug from inside our product”
Each user's button-tap lands them in their own real Busymate account, homed in your client's tenant, clamped to your capped role. Your product keeps its auth; ours keeps its tokens.
Partner
Meus usuários precisam de um login separado do Busymate?
Não — um toque os coloca no Busymate DevTools já autenticados como eles mesmos, sem pareamento, sem token copiado e sem segunda tela de login.
Quanto código preciso escrever para integrar?
Nenhum para o handoff em si. Registrar um cliente de federação é toda a configuração — não há código por parceiro para escrever ou manter.
Quais provedores de identidade são suportados?
Sessões do Directus, backends personalizados assinados com HMAC ou apps que já rodam seu próprio projeto Supabase.
O que impede um parceiro malicioso de tomar uma conta existente?
Identidades são chaveadas por (provedor, sujeito) e nunca se fundem a uma conta existente por e-mail a menos que quatro guardas rigorosas passem — e nunca a uma conta de admin.
How long does the sign-in link live, and can it be replayed?
The code in the link is single-use and expires in 60 seconds. Redeeming it requires the PKCE proof-of-possession, only its hash is ever stored, and HMAC assertions carry a single-use nonce checked atomically.
What happens when I disable a client or revoke a grant?
Disabling a client is re-checked on every sign-in start, so it bites immediately. Revoking an access grant deletes it — existing sessions keep their own expiry, but the delegated reach evaluates to nothing on the next database check.
Is there an audit trail for federated sign-ins?
Yes. Every start and exchange lands in the shared audit trail with the client, verify mode, outcome and denial reason — and denied events are written before the response goes out, so a probe can't outrun its own record.
Can a federated user ever become an admin?
No. A database trigger refuses an admin capped role on any client, the broker ignores role hints inside assertions, and email linking never merges into an admin or protected account.
Become
Registre um cliente. Os usuários ganham conta real e papel limitado — seu app nunca toca em um token.