One tap into
I tuoi utenti entrano autenticati come sé stessi — senza pairing, senza token copiati.
One tap for them,
Un ingresso a prova di takeover per partner con la propria base utenti — un’azione admin, zero token scambiati.
Un tap per loro
Il tuo utente clicca un pulsante nel tuo prodotto e arriva nella dashboard già autenticato. Nessun flusso di onboarding, nessuna credenziale da gestire, niente da spiegare nei tuoi documenti di supporto.
Un’azione admin per te
Registrare un singolo client di federazione è l’intera integrazione. Non c’è codice per-partner da scrivere, ospitare o mantenere — il tuo lato resta esattamente com’è.
Il tuo backend, a modo tuo
Funziona con sessioni Directus, backend custom firmati HMAC o app che già usano il proprio progetto Supabase. Il broker si adatta alla tua auth — non il contrario.
A prova di takeover, by design
Le identità sono chiavi su provider più subject — mai una semplice email. Il merge in un account esistente richiede il superamento di quattro guardie rigorose, e il merge in un admin è semplicemente impossibile.
Contenuto per default
Ogni utente provisionato atterra in un ruolo limitato, ogni client ha i propri rate limit e c’è un kill switch istantaneo se qualcosa sembra storto. Generoso con gli utenti, avaro coi privilegi.
How one tap
A short-lived, single-use code with proof-of-possession — the same shape as OAuth PKCE, minus any token in your hands.
Register one client
01An admin registers your federation client: the verify mode, a redirect allowlist, per-client rate limits, and the capped role every signed-in user receives.
Your backend vouches
02Your button calls the broker with a PKCE challenge. The broker verifies against YOUR auth — a live Directus session check, an HMAC-signed assertion, or your own Supabase JWT.
A 60-second code
03The user gets a link carrying a single-use code that expires in 60 seconds. Only its hash is stored, and the redirect target is decided server-side, at start time.
We mint the session
04The Busymate app or dashboard redeems the code with the PKCE proof and receives a real session for a real account. Your app never sees or stores a Busymate token.
Who can see
Defaults enforced by row-level security in the database — and the one explicit action that changes each of them.
| Question | The default | What changes it |
|---|---|---|
| Who sees a device? | Its owner, plus roles holding the devices-view capability — checked by the database on every read. | An admin-created access grant scoped to one device, service group, or user — with an optional expiry. |
| Who sees captured traffic? | The account that captured it. Traffic follows its captor, not the device it came from. | Nothing implicit — a device grant does not quietly widen traffic reads. |
| What role does a federated user get? | The client's capped role — a configurable least-privilege role. The database refuses an admin role at write time. | You edit the client's capped role. Role hints inside partner assertions are ignored by design. |
| Can an assertion take over an account? | No. Identity keys on client plus subject; a colliding email gets a private no-merge address instead of the existing account. | Email linking is a per-client opt-in — and even then it refuses admin and protected accounts. |
| Where can the flow redirect? | Busymate hosts plus the client's registered allowlist — exact host match; anything else collapses to the dashboard root. | The client's redirect allowlist, editable only by an admin with a confirmed write. |
| What if a client misbehaves? | Per-client rate limits that fail closed, and denial events written to the audit trail before the response is sent. | Flip the client's kill switch — it is re-checked on every sign-in start, so it takes effect immediately. |
Three real
Delegation and handover are explicit, scoped rows — not tribal shared passwords.
“Give our contractor the three staging phones”
One access grant: a non-admin role scoped to that service group, with an expiry date. Revoking deletes the row — the contractor's reach evaluates to nothing on the very next database check.
“Hand this device to a teammate”
An admin-confirmed transfer moves ownership in one transaction. Captured history stays with whoever captured it and device-local settings are wiped — a clean handover, not a data migration.
“Let our platform's users debug from inside our product”
Each user's button-tap lands them in their own real Busymate account, homed in your client's tenant, clamped to your capped role. Your product keeps its auth; ours keeps its tokens.
Partner
I miei utenti hanno bisogno di un login Busymate separato?
No — un tap li porta in Busymate DevTools già autenticati come loro stessi, senza pairing, senza token copiati e senza una seconda schermata di login.
Quanto codice devo scrivere per integrare?
Nessuno per il passaggio in sé. Registrare un client di federazione è tutto il setup — non c’è codice per-partner da scrivere o mantenere.
Quali identity provider sono supportati?
Sessioni Directus, backend custom firmati HMAC o app che già usano il proprio progetto Supabase.
Cosa impedisce a un partner malevolo di impossessarsi di un account esistente?
Le identità sono chiavi su (provider, subject) e non fanno mai merge in un account esistente per email a meno che quattro guardie rigorose non passino — e mai in un account admin.
How long does the sign-in link live, and can it be replayed?
The code in the link is single-use and expires in 60 seconds. Redeeming it requires the PKCE proof-of-possession, only its hash is ever stored, and HMAC assertions carry a single-use nonce checked atomically.
What happens when I disable a client or revoke a grant?
Disabling a client is re-checked on every sign-in start, so it bites immediately. Revoking an access grant deletes it — existing sessions keep their own expiry, but the delegated reach evaluates to nothing on the next database check.
Is there an audit trail for federated sign-ins?
Yes. Every start and exchange lands in the shared audit trail with the client, verify mode, outcome and denial reason — and denied events are written before the response goes out, so a probe can't outrun its own record.
Can a federated user ever become an admin?
No. A database trigger refuses an admin capped role on any client, the broker ignores role hints inside assertions, and email linking never merges into an admin or protected account.
Become
Registra un client. Gli utenti ricevono un account reale e un ruolo limitato — la tua app non tocca mai un token.