One tap into
Tus usuarios entran identificados como ellos mismos — sin emparejar, sin tokens copiados.
One tap for them,
Una entrada a prueba de robos para partners con su propia base de usuarios — una acción de admin, cero tokens intercambiados.
Un toque para ellos
Tu usuario pulsa un botón en tu producto y llega al panel ya autenticado. Sin onboarding, sin credenciales que gestionar, nada que explicar en tu documentación de soporte.
Una acción de administrador para ti
Registrar un único cliente de federación es toda la integración. No hay código por partner que escribir, alojar o mantener — tu lado queda exactamente como está.
Tu backend, a tu manera
Funciona con sesiones de Directus, backends personalizados firmados con HMAC o apps que ya usan su propio proyecto de Supabase. El broker se adapta a tu auth — no al revés.
A prueba de secuestros por diseño
Las identidades se claven en proveedor más sujeto — nunca un email a secas. Fusionarse con una cuenta existente exige pasar cuatro guardas estrictas, y fusionarse con un admin es sencillamente imposible.
Contenido por defecto
Cada usuario aprovisionado cae en un rol acotado, cada cliente lleva sus propios límites de tasa y hay un interruptor de emergencia instantáneo si algo pinta mal. Generoso con los usuarios, tacaño con los privilegios.
How one tap
A short-lived, single-use code with proof-of-possession — the same shape as OAuth PKCE, minus any token in your hands.
Register one client
01An admin registers your federation client: the verify mode, a redirect allowlist, per-client rate limits, and the capped role every signed-in user receives.
Your backend vouches
02Your button calls the broker with a PKCE challenge. The broker verifies against YOUR auth — a live Directus session check, an HMAC-signed assertion, or your own Supabase JWT.
A 60-second code
03The user gets a link carrying a single-use code that expires in 60 seconds. Only its hash is stored, and the redirect target is decided server-side, at start time.
We mint the session
04The Busymate app or dashboard redeems the code with the PKCE proof and receives a real session for a real account. Your app never sees or stores a Busymate token.
Who can see
Defaults enforced by row-level security in the database — and the one explicit action that changes each of them.
| Question | The default | What changes it |
|---|---|---|
| Who sees a device? | Its owner, plus roles holding the devices-view capability — checked by the database on every read. | An admin-created access grant scoped to one device, service group, or user — with an optional expiry. |
| Who sees captured traffic? | The account that captured it. Traffic follows its captor, not the device it came from. | Nothing implicit — a device grant does not quietly widen traffic reads. |
| What role does a federated user get? | The client's capped role — a configurable least-privilege role. The database refuses an admin role at write time. | You edit the client's capped role. Role hints inside partner assertions are ignored by design. |
| Can an assertion take over an account? | No. Identity keys on client plus subject; a colliding email gets a private no-merge address instead of the existing account. | Email linking is a per-client opt-in — and even then it refuses admin and protected accounts. |
| Where can the flow redirect? | Busymate hosts plus the client's registered allowlist — exact host match; anything else collapses to the dashboard root. | The client's redirect allowlist, editable only by an admin with a confirmed write. |
| What if a client misbehaves? | Per-client rate limits that fail closed, and denial events written to the audit trail before the response is sent. | Flip the client's kill switch — it is re-checked on every sign-in start, so it takes effect immediately. |
Three real
Delegation and handover are explicit, scoped rows — not tribal shared passwords.
“Give our contractor the three staging phones”
One access grant: a non-admin role scoped to that service group, with an expiry date. Revoking deletes the row — the contractor's reach evaluates to nothing on the very next database check.
“Hand this device to a teammate”
An admin-confirmed transfer moves ownership in one transaction. Captured history stays with whoever captured it and device-local settings are wiped — a clean handover, not a data migration.
“Let our platform's users debug from inside our product”
Each user's button-tap lands them in their own real Busymate account, homed in your client's tenant, clamped to your capped role. Your product keeps its auth; ours keeps its tokens.
Partner
¿Mis usuarios necesitan un login de Busymate aparte?
No — un toque los deja en Busymate DevTools ya autenticados como ellos mismos, sin emparejamiento, sin tokens copiados y sin segunda pantalla de login.
¿Cuánto código tengo que escribir para integrarme?
Ninguno para el traspaso en sí. Registrar un cliente de federación es toda la configuración — no hay código por partner que escribir ni mantener.
¿Qué proveedores de identidad se soportan?
Sesiones de Directus, backends personalizados firmados con HMAC o apps que ya usan su propio proyecto de Supabase.
¿Qué impide que un partner malicioso secuestre una cuenta existente?
Las identidades se claven en (proveedor, sujeto) y nunca se fusionan con una cuenta existente por email salvo que pasen cuatro guardas estrictas — y jamás con una cuenta de admin.
How long does the sign-in link live, and can it be replayed?
The code in the link is single-use and expires in 60 seconds. Redeeming it requires the PKCE proof-of-possession, only its hash is ever stored, and HMAC assertions carry a single-use nonce checked atomically.
What happens when I disable a client or revoke a grant?
Disabling a client is re-checked on every sign-in start, so it bites immediately. Revoking an access grant deletes it — existing sessions keep their own expiry, but the delegated reach evaluates to nothing on the next database check.
Is there an audit trail for federated sign-ins?
Yes. Every start and exchange lands in the shared audit trail with the client, verify mode, outcome and denial reason — and denied events are written before the response goes out, so a probe can't outrun its own record.
Can a federated user ever become an admin?
No. A database trigger refuses an admin capped role on any client, the broker ignores role hints inside assertions, and email linking never merges into an admin or protected account.
Become
Registra un cliente. Los usuarios reciben una cuenta real y un rol acotado — tu app nunca toca un token.