One tap into
Deine Nutzer landen als sie selbst angemeldet — kein Pairing, keine kopierten Tokens.
One tap for them,
Ein übernahmesicherer Zugang für Partner mit eigener Nutzerbasis — eine Admin-Aktion, null Tokens ausgetauscht.
Ein Tap für sie
Dein Nutzer klickt einen Button in deinem Produkt und landet im Dashboard — bereits angemeldet. Kein Onboarding-Flow, keine Zugangsdaten zu verwalten, nichts für deine Support-Docs.
Eine Admin-Aktion für dich
Einen einzigen Federation-Client zu registrieren ist die ganze Integration. Es gibt keinen Partner-Code zu schreiben, zu hosten oder zu pflegen — deine Seite bleibt exakt, wie sie ist.
Dein Backend, deine Art
Funktioniert mit Directus-Sessions, HMAC-signierten Custom-Backends oder Apps, die schon ihr eigenes Supabase-Projekt betreiben. Der Broker passt sich deiner Auth an — nicht umgekehrt.
Takeover-sicher by design
Identitäten schlüsseln auf Provider plus Subject — nie auf eine nackte E-Mail. Das Mergen in einen bestehenden Account verlangt vier strikte Guards, und das Mergen in einen Admin ist schlicht unmöglich.
Eingehegt by default
Jeder provisionierte Nutzer landet in einer gedeckelten Rolle, jeder Client trägt eigene Rate-Limits, und es gibt einen sofortigen Kill-Switch, falls etwas komisch aussieht. Großzügig zu Nutzern, geizig mit Privilegien.
How one tap
A short-lived, single-use code with proof-of-possession — the same shape as OAuth PKCE, minus any token in your hands.
Register one client
01An admin registers your federation client: the verify mode, a redirect allowlist, per-client rate limits, and the capped role every signed-in user receives.
Your backend vouches
02Your button calls the broker with a PKCE challenge. The broker verifies against YOUR auth — a live Directus session check, an HMAC-signed assertion, or your own Supabase JWT.
A 60-second code
03The user gets a link carrying a single-use code that expires in 60 seconds. Only its hash is stored, and the redirect target is decided server-side, at start time.
We mint the session
04The Busymate app or dashboard redeems the code with the PKCE proof and receives a real session for a real account. Your app never sees or stores a Busymate token.
Who can see
Defaults enforced by row-level security in the database — and the one explicit action that changes each of them.
| Question | The default | What changes it |
|---|---|---|
| Who sees a device? | Its owner, plus roles holding the devices-view capability — checked by the database on every read. | An admin-created access grant scoped to one device, service group, or user — with an optional expiry. |
| Who sees captured traffic? | The account that captured it. Traffic follows its captor, not the device it came from. | Nothing implicit — a device grant does not quietly widen traffic reads. |
| What role does a federated user get? | The client's capped role — a configurable least-privilege role. The database refuses an admin role at write time. | You edit the client's capped role. Role hints inside partner assertions are ignored by design. |
| Can an assertion take over an account? | No. Identity keys on client plus subject; a colliding email gets a private no-merge address instead of the existing account. | Email linking is a per-client opt-in — and even then it refuses admin and protected accounts. |
| Where can the flow redirect? | Busymate hosts plus the client's registered allowlist — exact host match; anything else collapses to the dashboard root. | The client's redirect allowlist, editable only by an admin with a confirmed write. |
| What if a client misbehaves? | Per-client rate limits that fail closed, and denial events written to the audit trail before the response is sent. | Flip the client's kill switch — it is re-checked on every sign-in start, so it takes effect immediately. |
Three real
Delegation and handover are explicit, scoped rows — not tribal shared passwords.
“Give our contractor the three staging phones”
One access grant: a non-admin role scoped to that service group, with an expiry date. Revoking deletes the row — the contractor's reach evaluates to nothing on the very next database check.
“Hand this device to a teammate”
An admin-confirmed transfer moves ownership in one transaction. Captured history stays with whoever captured it and device-local settings are wiped — a clean handover, not a data migration.
“Let our platform's users debug from inside our product”
Each user's button-tap lands them in their own real Busymate account, homed in your client's tenant, clamped to your capped role. Your product keeps its auth; ours keeps its tokens.
Partner
Brauchen meine Nutzer einen separaten Busymate-Login?
Nein — ein Tap bringt sie bereits als sie selbst angemeldet in Busymate DevTools, ohne Pairing, ohne kopiertes Token und ohne zweiten Login-Screen.
Wie viel Code muss ich für die Integration schreiben?
Keinen für die Übergabe selbst. Einen Federation-Client zu registrieren ist das ganze Setup — es gibt keinen Partner-Code zu schreiben oder zu pflegen.
Welche Identity-Provider werden unterstützt?
Directus-Sessions, HMAC-signierte Custom-Backends oder Apps, die bereits ihr eigenes Supabase-Projekt betreiben.
Was hindert einen bösartigen Partner daran, einen bestehenden Account zu übernehmen?
Identitäten schlüsseln auf (Provider, Subject) und mergen nie per E-Mail in einen bestehenden Account, außer vier strikte Guards passieren — und nie in einen Admin-Account.
How long does the sign-in link live, and can it be replayed?
The code in the link is single-use and expires in 60 seconds. Redeeming it requires the PKCE proof-of-possession, only its hash is ever stored, and HMAC assertions carry a single-use nonce checked atomically.
What happens when I disable a client or revoke a grant?
Disabling a client is re-checked on every sign-in start, so it bites immediately. Revoking an access grant deletes it — existing sessions keep their own expiry, but the delegated reach evaluates to nothing on the next database check.
Is there an audit trail for federated sign-ins?
Yes. Every start and exchange lands in the shared audit trail with the client, verify mode, outcome and denial reason — and denied events are written before the response goes out, so a probe can't outrun its own record.
Can a federated user ever become an admin?
No. A database trigger refuses an admin capped role on any client, the broker ignores role hints inside assertions, and email linking never merges into an admin or protected account.
Become
Registriere einen Client. Nutzer bekommen ein echtes Konto und eine begrenzte Rolle — deine App berührt nie einen Token.